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Evaluation of WPRS Systems
Katherine P. Dickinson




Social Policy Research Associates
In 1993, Congress enacted Public Law 103-152, which amended
the Social Security Act by requiring states to establish a system of pro-
filing new unemployment insurance (UI) claimants that
• identifies which claimants are likely to exhaust UI benefits and,
therefore, need job search assistance to successfully transition to
new employment,
• refers such claimants to reemployment services in a timely man-
ner, and
• collects follow-up information relating to reemployment ser-
vices received by such claimants and the employment outcomes
subsequent to receiving such services.
The law also requires claimants referred to reemployment services to
participate in those or similar services as a condition of eligibility for
UI unless the claimant has already completed services or has “justifi-
able cause” for not participating.
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) funded Social Policy Re-
search Associates and Mathematica Policy Research to evaluate the im-
plementation and impact of this Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS) Systems initiative.  The goals of the evaluation were
to
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1) Describe the ways that states are operating WPRS systems.
Aspects of WPRS implementation include
• developing coordination among partnering agencies,
• identifying and selecting claimants at risk of benefit exhaus-
tion,
• providing reemployment services,
• obtaining feedback about the extent that profiled and re-
ferred claimants meet their participation requirements, and
• identifying different strategies for implementing and operat-
ing WPRS systems that may influence the effectiveness of
WPRS systems.
2) Determine the effectiveness of WPRS systems.  Specifically,
we evaluated the effectiveness of WPRS in 
• increasing receipt of reemployment services among those
likely to exhaust their UI benefits,
• reducing receipt of UI and the extent that UI benefits are ex-
hausted, and
• increasing subsequent employment and earnings of UI
claimants.
3) Provide recommendations to enhance the ability of WPRS sys-
tems to meet the goals of the WPRS legislation. 
This chapter highlights the results of this four-year evaluation.1
The results presented in this chapter are based on data from two
primary sources.  First, in both 1996 and 1997, we surveyed adminis-
trators in all states about the implementation and operations of their
WPRS systems.  Because WPRS requires coordination among several
agencies, we surveyed four respondents in each state: administrators of
the UI, the employment service (ES), and Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) programs, and the ad-
ministrator responsible for coordinating WPRS operations.
Second, we obtained claimant-level data from a sample of eight
states, which were chosen to represent variation in the intensity of
reemployment services provided under WPRS.  We obtained UI and la-
bor market outcome data for all claimants who filed an initial claim in
the last two quarters of 1995 or any time in 1996 and who were subject
to referral to mandatory reemployment services through WPRS (that is,
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not screened out because of a definite recall date, union hall member-
ship, or other characteristics).  Those who were referred to WPRS ser-
vices constitute the “treatment group” and those who were not referred
constitute the “comparison group.”
IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF WPRS SYSTEM
Developing effective WPRS systems involves many complex
tasks.  States need to develop methods to identify claimants who are at
risk of exhausting their benefits, refer such claimants to local offices for
services, provide services appropriate to those claimants, track
claimants’ progress in services, establish policies about determinations
and denials for those who do not participate satisfactorily, and track the
subsequent outcomes of WPRS claimants.  To accomplish these tasks,
states need to develop effective coordination and communication link-
ages among the participating agencies—usually UI, ES, and ED-
WAA—that may not have worked closely together in the past.
The results of both the 1996 and 1997 state administrator surveys
indicate that, by and large, states have carried out these complex tasks,
meeting the legislated requirements as well as following DOL guidance
for implementing WPRS systems.  Below we describe the implementa-
tion of each of the WPRS requirements.
Identification and Selection of UI Claimants
All states have implemented a two-step profiling process to identi-
fy claimants at risk of exhausting their benefits.  First, all states
screened out claimants on recall status and those attached to union hir-
ing halls, as required in DOL guidance.  States also frequently screened
out claimants working in seasonal industries, who may also be expect-
ed to be recalled, and interstate claimants.
Second, all states then used a further profiling method to identify
claimants who had high probabilities of exhausting their benefits.
DOL encouraged states to use a statistical model to identify such
claimants.  To facilitate this, DOL developed a national model as an
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example and provided technical assistance to states in developing their
own models.
By 1997, about 85 percent of the states were using a statistical
model to identify claimants at risk of exhausting their benefits.  Among
those states using a model, 85 percent developed state-specific models
to predict which claimants were likely to exhaust UI benefits in their
specific state.  Most of these used a single model statewide, although a
few states, such as Kentucky and Washington, developed multiple
models that were fine-tuned to the specific circumstances of separate
regions within their states.
In contrast, 15 percent of the states that used a statistical model
simply adopted the entire national model, including its coefficients.  Al-
though the national model identified key variables that affected UI ex-
haustion nationally, we found that state-specific models varied widely
both in the characteristics that affected UI exhaustion and in the direc-
tion of the impacts of those characteristics.  For example, some states
found that lower-wage workers were more likely to exhaust benefits,
while other states found that higher-wage workers were more likely to
do so.  States that use the coefficients from the national model, there-
fore, probably are not targeting WPRS services as accurately as states
that developed their own model.
The 15 percent of states that did not use a statistical model relied
instead on a characteristics screen.  Under this approach, the state iden-
tifies a few characteristics associated with exhaustion, creates a pool of
claimants with those characteristics, and then randomly selects
claimants among the pool to refer to WPRS services.  This approach is
also less accurate than a state model because it accounts for relatively
few characteristics and makes no distinction among individuals within
the pool.
States used a variety of characteristics in their profiling model or
characteristics screens in 1997.  Virtually all states included a measure
of the claimant’s previous industry or occupation.  Over 90 percent of
the states included some claimant characteristics in their statistical
model or characteristics screen, most commonly education and job
tenure.  Three-quarters of states included some indicator of the local
economy in the area where a claimant lived.  Less frequently, states in-
cluded a claimant’s previous wage in their profiling methodology (30
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percent) or measures of potential UI benefits, such as weekly benefit
amount or total entitlement (45 percent).
Although all states intended to refer claimants with the highest
probability of UI exhaustion to services, this did not always occur be-
cause of errors in implementing profiling and selection at both the state
and local levels.  In our impact analyses in this phase and an earlier
phase of the project, we collected claimant-level data from 12 states.
Two of these 12 states made errors in implementing their profiling pro-
cedures.  One inadvertently matched the wrong profiling score to indi-
vidual claimants’ records; the other incorrectly identified which
claimants had the highest scores.  Further, in three additional states, we
found that a substantial number of local offices did not systematically
refer claimants with the highest scores to services.  None of these states
were aware of their implementation problems.
Given the problems that we uncovered, we strongly recommend that
states or DOL establish quality control measures to ensure that states are
carrying out profiling as intended and that local offices are selecting
claimants as intended.  We recommend that states review on an ongoing
basis the information used for profiling and selecting claimants for
WPRS services, the resulting calculated scores, and the relationship be-
tween those scores and referral to services in each local office.
The percentage of profiled claimants (i.e., those not initially









30 or more 12 11
SOURCE:  Employment and Training Administration Form
9048.
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screened out) who were referred to services varied widely across states,
from a low of 1 percent to a high of 100 percent, with an average of 13
percent.  Further, the percentage of states that referred fewer than 5 per-
cent of their claimants to WPRS services increased from 24 percent in
FY 96–97 to 31 percent in FY 97–98, as shown in Table 3.1.
One reason for this trend may be that states increasingly deferred to
local offices in determining the number of claimants referred in each
office.  Although this policy helped states and local areas match the ca-
pacity for service to the number of claimants who are referred (as re-
quired by DOL guidance), it resulted in states having less control over
the number of claimants receiving reemployment services.
We found that the WPRS goal of referring selected claimants early
in their unemployment spell was being met.  Most states profiled
claimants within two weeks of their initial claim, notified claimants
promptly, and required them to report to services soon after notifica-
tion.  As states have gained experience in conducting these tasks, the
timeliness of WPRS referrals has increased.
Reemployment Services
The legislation authorizing WPRS allows a wide range of reem-
ployment services within WPRS.  An increasing number of states es-
tablished specific requirements for a core set of mandatory services to
be provided to all WPRS claimants, although the content of those ser-
vices was most often left to local discretion.  Virtually all states re-
quired an orientation—typically an hour or less—to explain WPRS ser-
vices and claimants’ responsibilities.
More than half of the states then required claimants to attend a
group workshop.  Typically these workshops provided labor market in-
formation, training in job search methods, guidance in preparing re-
sumes, and help in exploring career alternatives.  In two-thirds of these
states, required workshops also provided claimants with referrals to job
openings.  About half of these workshops culminated in the develop-
ment of individual service plans.  Most of these required workshops
were brief, the majority lasting four hours or less.  About three-quarters
of the states required all profiled and referred claimants to meet one-on-
one with an employment counselor, usually for one hour, to assess
claimants’ interests and abilities and develop a service plan.
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Although one of DOL’s “basic operational concepts” for WPRS
calls for customized services that are based on each claimant’s needs,
the extent that states conformed to this principle varied.  In about one-
third of the states, almost no claimants were required to participate in
any services beyond the mandatory core services required of all WPRS
claimants.  In contrast, in 30 percent of the states, more than half of
WPRS claimants were required to participate in varying types of addi-
tional services, as specified in their individual service plans.
As shown in Table 3.2, the length and number of services required
of WPRS claimants varied widely among states.2 Several states re-
quired substantial WPRS participation, whether measured as the num-
ber of required services or the length of required participation in ser-
vices.  About 26 percent of states required a large number of services
(i.e., seven or more), while 27 percent required relatively long partici-
pation (i.e., more than 10 hours).  At the other end of the spectrum, 23
percent of states required no more than three services, and 16 percent of
states required no more than four hours of participation.
In states that provide less extensive services, customers are likely
to be less satisfied with WPRS services.  In an earlier phase of this
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until UI benefits stop 22
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study, we conducted a customer satisfaction survey of 2,000 claimants
who were referred to services in six states that implemented WPRS ear-
ly.  We found that customers were far more satisfied with WPRS ser-
vices when they received more services and services of longer duration.
For example, among WPRS claimants who received two or fewer ser-
vices, only 15 percent rated the services as very or extremely helpful.
In contrast, among those who received seven or more services, nearly
55 percent rated WPRS services highly.  Similarly, among claimants
who participated in services lasting five or fewer hours, only 25 percent
rated services extremely or very helpful compared to 60 percent of
those who participated in services lasting 20 hours or more.
In selecting providers of WPRS services, states generally followed
two strategies.  About two-thirds of the states referred most of their
WPRS claimants to ES for reemployment services and generally re-
ferred claimants to EDWAA only for education or training services.  In
these states, ES provided services to 75 percent or more of the WPRS
claimants.
The remaining states referred the most job-ready to ES for job re-
ferral services and referred to EDWAA those who needed more ser-
vices, including more extensive reemployment services as well as oc-
cupational or educational skills training.
Tracking WPRS Claimants’ Progress in Services
The WPRS legislation requires referred claimants to participate 
in services as a condition of UI receipt.  To ensure that profiled and
referred claimants report to services and participate satisfactorily,
WPRS service providers must provide UI with accurate and timely
feedback.
Virtually all states developed an automated data system to track
WPRS claimants’ progress in services.  The information contained in
the automated systems, however, varied widely.  Only half of the states
automated WPRS claimants’ service plans so that the progress of the
claimants could be automatically tracked.  In the remainder of the
states, staff needed to manually check that claimants were participating
satisfactorily in the services called for in their service plans.
About one-half of the states developed new data systems specifi-
cally for WPRS, although the sophistication of the resulting data sys-
tems varied.  In many cases, the WPRS systems were not linked elec-
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tronically to the UI or service provider systems.  As a result, data often
had to be entered twice, and paper reports were needed to communicate
about WPRS participants.
Most of the remaining states modified their existing systems—pre-
dominately their ES systems—to track WPRS claimants’ progress.
Again, many of these systems lacked linkages with UI data systems so
that data needed to be entered twice.
UI administrators reported that developing a system to track the
progress of claimants was one of the most difficult WPRS-related tasks.
It is clear that further automation of claimant tracking processes, espe-
cially automated service plans, could make these processes more effi-
cient.
Determinations and Denials
Because participation in WPRS services is a condition of continued
UI eligibility, states needed to develop policies about how and when
WPRS claimants would be denied benefits for failure to cooperate with
the WPRS requirements.3 The process of denying UI benefits because
of failure to comply with WPRS requirements varied among states.
About 25 percent of the states initiated the benefit-denial process when
a claimant missed a scheduled meeting, while the other 75 percent of
the states gave claimants a warning and a chance to reschedule.  When
claimants were denied benefits, about half the states continued to deny
benefits until the problem had been corrected, while the other states de-
nied benefits for only one week.
The most common reason that WPRS claimants were denied bene-
fits was failure to report to orientation.  Denials for claimants failing to
make satisfactory progress in the required services were far less com-
mon.  Increasingly, states assumed that claimants were participating
satisfactorily unless notified to the contrary by providers.  This is not
surprising given the difficulty in automatically tracking claimants’
progress in most states’ management information systems.
Tracking Outcomes
Legislation requires that states track the outcomes achieved by
WPRS claimants, and DOL has established a required outcome re-
port.  In 1997, only 58 percent of the states collected information on
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outcomes for WPRS claimants.  It is likely, however, that the number
of states tracking outcomes has increased since the DOL reporting
requirements took effect last year.  Among states collecting infor-
mation on outcomes, states commonly tracked initial placements 
and/or entered employments, earnings for specific periods after initial
claims, and reemployment industry.  Over 40 percent of UI adminis-
trators reported that identifying appropriate outcomes or developing a
system to track outcomes for WPRS was a very or extremely difficult
task.
Coordination among Agencies
In many states, the UI, ES, and EDWAA programs coordinated ex-
tensively in WPRS-related activities.  To summarize the extent of coop-
eration, we grouped WPRS activities into three major tasks: tasks relat-
ed to developing services, tasks related to developing data systems, and
tasks related to developing a profiling method.4 We found the follow-
ing three modes of cooperation between UI and ES, the agencies most
involved in WPRS activities:
• Dominant agency:  In about 25 percent of the states, a single
agency was either very or extremely involved in developing
WPRS policies in all areas, while the other agency was at most
somewhat involved.  In a large majority of the cases it was ES
that was the dominant agency.
• Division of labor:  In another 20 percent of the states, ES and UI
divided responsibility for WPRS tasks.  Most commonly, ES led
the tasks related to services and the data system, while UI led the
development of the profiling model.
• Shared leadership:  In the remaining 55 percent of the states, UI
and ES shared the leadership of at least one of the three major
tasks.  Most commonly, these two agencies shared the tasks re-
lated to data systems and the development of the profiling mod-
el, while ES led the service-related tasks.
In about half of the states, EDWAA was not substantially involved in
any of the three groups of tasks.  When EDWAA was involved, it was
almost always in cooperation with ES.  Not surprisingly, EDWAA was
most involved in service-related tasks, although in about one-quarter of
the states EDWAA was also involved in developing data systems.
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Even though WPRS requires extensive coordination among agen-
cies, the administrators reported that getting the state agencies to work
together was not difficult.  States also reported that it was not difficult
to get the local offices to work together on WPRS tasks.
FUNDING OF WPRS
UI funds accounted for 40 percent of total funding earmarked for
WPRS.  Most UI funding came from grants that DOL awarded to help
states cover the costs of implementing WPRS systems—such as devel-
oping profiling models and tracking systems.
EDWAA funding of WPRS activities equaled UI funding in 1997.
Most of the EDWAA funds came from Governor’s Reserve funds, al-
though supplemental EDWAA grants for WPRS implementation ac-
counted for about 10 percent of WPRS funding.  Because UI imple-
mentation grants were one-time grants, funds for dislocated workers
will likely be a primary source of WPRS funding in the future.
ES funding specifically earmarked for WPRS accounted for less
than 15 percent of total WPRS funding, despite the fact that ES was the
major provider of WPRS services and many local offices have dedicat-
ed specific staff to WPRS activities.  Over one-third of ES administra-
tors reported that arranging for adequate funding for WPRS was a very
or extremely difficult task.
OPINIONS ABOUT WPRS SYSTEMS
Overall, state administrators were very supportive of the WPRS ap-
proach.  About two-thirds of all administrators felt that WPRS met its
goal of reducing the length of UI receipt among profiled and referred
claimants.  Most felt that the mandatory nature of services was justi-
fied.
Administrators indicated that WPRS had other benefits as well, in-
cluding improving overall coordination among their agencies.  Most
also felt that WPRS improved services for all job seekers, not just
WPRS claimants.
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OUTCOMES OF WPRS
The second component of this study is an analysis of the impacts of
WPRS on UI and labor market outcomes of referred claimants.  To de-
termine the effectiveness of the WPRS systems on claimants’ out-
comes, we needed a method to determine what the outcomes for the re-
ferred claimants would have been in the absence of WPRS.  To do this,
we selected a “comparison group” of similar claimants who were not
referred to WPRS.  The ideal way to develop such a comparison group
would be to conduct a classical experiment by randomly assigning
claimants to two groups: one group that is referred to WPRS and anoth-
er that is not.  Because WPRS was implemented as an ongoing
statewide program, however, we were unable to conduct such an exper-
iment to evaluate it.
We therefore chose an alternative comparison group—claimants
who passed the initial WPRS screens but were not referred to services.
Although nonreferred claimants, by design, differ from referred
claimants in that they have lower predicted probabilities of UI exhaus-
tion, two factors enhance the validity of this design.
First, because claimants were referred to WPRS on the basis of
known criteria, we can control for these criteria using regression meth-
ods.  This situation is unlike that in other quasi-experimental evalua-
tions where individuals choose to participate in a program.  In those
cases, the participation in services is determined partly by unmeasur-
able factors, such as individual motivation, which cannot be included
in a regression model.  Our ability to know and control for the fac-
tors that determine referral to WPRS should enhance the validity of
our comparison group methodology and, therefore, the results of our
analysis.
Second, the validity of our design is enhanced because the predict-
ed probabilities of UI exhaustion for referred and nonreferred claimants
overlap considerably.  This overlap usually came about because of local
capacity constraints.  In the eight states in our study, each local office
was responsible for selecting the number of claimants to refer to ser-
vices, based on its capacity to serve new claimants each week.  Because
these capacity constraints varied by office and by week, the predicted
probabilities of claimants referred to services statewide overlapped
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considerably with the probabilities of those not referred to services.  As
a result, we can compare outcomes for claimants referred to services
with those for claimants with similar scores but who were not referred
to services.
Impacts on Services
Comparison of referred and nonreferred claimants in our sample of
states indicates that WPRS is meeting the goals of providing reemploy-
ment services at a greater rate and earlier in claimants’ unemployment
experience.  Referred claimants were up to 50 percentage points more
likely to receive at least one service (beyond WPRS orientation), and
they received significantly more types of services than nonreferred
claimants.  WPRS had the largest impacts on receipt of job search
workshops and job clubs.  Referred claimants were also more likely to
be enrolled in EDWAA, although usually for basic readjustment ser-
vices rather than training.  Finally, in most states, referred claimants re-
ceived services earlier in their unemployment spells than did nonre-
ferred claimants.
Impacts on UI Benefits, Employment, and Earnings
WPRS services were expected to reduce UI benefit receipt among
claimants targeted for services by assisting them in finding a new job
quickly.  Previous studies found that the general service approach used
in WPRS can reduce UI receipt.  For example, a mandatory job search
assistance package offered to UI claimants in the New Jersey UI Reem-
ployment Demonstration in 1986–1987 reduced average UI receipt by
about half a week (Corson et al. 1989).  More recently, similar manda-
tory job search assistance services provided to claimants in Florida and
in Washington, D.C., in 1995–1996 reduced UI receipt by about half a
week in Florida and about one week in Washington, D.C. (Decker et al.
2000).  Experiments in job search assistance in other states have gener-
ated similarly moderate reductions in UI receipt (Meyer 1995).
To determine the impact of WPRS on claimants’ UI receipt, we
used two measures as dependent variables in our regressions: weeks of
UI benefits paid and dollars of UI benefits paid.  The estimated impacts






Table 3.3  Estimated Impacts of WPRS on UI Outcomes
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NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** = Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-
tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; * = statistically signif-
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WPRS generally reduced UI benefits received by the claimants in
the states we examined.  In five of the six states for which we were able
to generate estimates—Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, and
New Jersey—WPRS significantly reduced average weeks of UI bene-
fits per claimant.5 As shown in Table 3.3, the estimated UI reductions
ranged from 0.21 weeks in Kentucky to nearly a full week in Maine.6
In all five states except Kentucky, WPRS also significantly reduced
dollars of benefits received, with reductions of up to about $140 per
claimant in New Jersey.  In the sixth state, South Carolina, WPRS ap-
pears to have had no impact on UI receipt—claimants referred to
WPRS services had approximately the same UI outcomes as did similar
claimants not referred to services.
WPRS was also expected to help claimants return to work sooner,
thereby increasing employment and earnings in the short run.  Further-
more, to the extent that WPRS claimants learned about better paying,
more stable jobs through WPRS than they would have found on their
own, it was possible that WPRS would increase employment and earn-
ings in the long run as well.
Earlier studies of the WPRS approach have generated inconsistent
findings about the impact on employment and earnings.  In the New
Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration, mandatory job search assis-
tance was found to have significant impacts on employment in the first
two quarters after the initial benefit claim and significant impacts on
earnings in the first quarter (Corson et al. 1989).  More recently, the Job
Search Assistance Demonstration was found to have uneven impacts on
employment and earnings of claimants, improving earnings in one
demonstration state (Washington, D.C.) but not in the other (Florida).
Our estimates provide little evidence that WPRS increased the em-
ployment or earnings of referred claimants.  Most of the estimated im-
pacts on employment and earnings, which are presented in Table 3.4,
are not statistically different than zero, and the statistically significant
estimated impacts are as likely to be negative as they are to be positive.
The only significantly positive impacts on earnings occurred in Maine
(in the first, third, and fourth quarters) and New Jersey (in the third
quarter), both states where WPRS significantly reduced UI receipt.
However, our estimates also suggest that WPRS reduced the rate of em-






Table 3.4  Estimated Effects of WRPS on Employment and Earnings
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NOTE: Quarters 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the first, second, third, and fourth full calendar quarters following the first payment.  Standard er-
rors are in parentheses.  *** = Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically sig-
nificant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; * = statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-
tailed test.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the results of this study, we make the following rec-
ommendations to improve the implementation and impact of WPRS
services.
Improving Profiling and Referral to Services
• States should provide greater ongoing monitoring of state and
local profiling and referral practices to ensure that they are being
carried out as intended.
Profiling, selection, and referral processes are complex and involve
many levels of staff: statistical analysts who develop the profiling pro-
cedures, programming and data processing staff who implement profil-
ing procedures and calculate probability scores for claimants each
week, and state and/or local program staff who select and refer specific
claimants based on those probability scores.  We found several states
where staff were not carrying out these processes as intended, either be-
cause of errors or lack of understanding of the intent of WPRS.  We
strongly recommend, therefore, that states routinely monitor the ways
that both state and local staff are implementing WPRS procedures.
• States should periodically update their models to reflect changes
in the factors that affect UI exhaustion.
Many states have not modified their profiling models since they
first implemented WPRS.  In our discussions with state and local staff,
several respondents indicated that they felt their models had become
out of date, especially because industries and occupations in decline in
their states have changed over time.  We recommend, therefore, that
states reestimate their models with current data.
Improving WPRS Services
• States and local areas should provide more extensive, in-depth
services that are customized to the needs of individual claimants.
We found that a substantial number of states are neither requiring
nor making available extensive services for claimants.  Our customer
78 Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer
satisfaction survey found that customers highly valued more extensive
services, and those who received such services found WPRS much
more helpful than did other claimants.  Further, our impact results sug-
gest that the states in which WPRS reduced UI receipt were also states
with large impacts on claimants’ receipt of services.  Improving WPRS
services, therefore, is likely to both increase customer satisfaction and
result in greater UI savings.
The administration recently announced a Universal Reemployment
initiative, which has a five-year goal of ensuring that every dislocated
worker can receive the training and reemployment services that they
want and need.  To support this initiative, DOL has requested funding
for Reemployment Services Grants to the ES, which are to be used for
providing increased reemployment services to UI claimants.  These
grants, therefore, are a potentially important funding source for more
extensive WPRS services.
• To facilitate improving services, DOL should provide guidance
to states and local areas about Workforce Investment Act ser-
vices appropriate for WPRS claimants.
The recently enacted Workforce Investment Act (WIA) revamps
the workforce delivery system, replacing the existing EDWAA pro-
gram with new dislocated worker services that must be delivered, along
with ES services, through one-stop centers.  The legislation calls for
universal access to one-stop core services but limits access to WIA in-
tensive services to individuals who have been determined in need of
such services to obtain employment.  Many WPRS claimants will like-
ly need more than the core services, which are often self-access ser-
vices that provide labor market information and information about job
openings.  To encourage states to provide WPRS claimants with inten-
sive services when needed, we recommend that DOL provide guidance
that claimants referred to WPRS services automatically qualify for
WIA intensive services.
Increasing the Number of Claimants Referred to WPRS
• States that currently refer few claimants through WPRS should
increase the number of UI claimants who receive reemployment
services.
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In 30 percent of the states, fewer than 5 percent of claimants are re-
ferred to WPRS services.  These states should increase the percentage
of claimants referred.  Further, trends within the UI system imply that
other states should consider increasing the referral rates as well.  As
more states shift to taking initial claims by telephone and eliminate the
requirement for mandatory ES registration, WPRS is increasingly the
only means through which claimants are systematically linked to reem-
ployment services.  The proposed Reemployment Services grants could
also be used to provide services to more WPRS claimants.
Enforcing Participation Requirements
• States should enforce the requirement that referred claimants
participate in the services required in their service plans.
Most states appear to enforce the requirement that WPRS claimants
report for an orientation but are more lax in enforcing requirements for
satisfactory progress in required services.  Our outcome evaluation
suggests that strict enforcement is important to WPRS achieving its
goal of reducing UI receipt.  We recommend, therefore, that states more
strictly enforce participation requirements.
Improving Data Systems to Track Progress 
in Services and Outcomes
• States should improve their WPRS tracking process to make it
more efficient and more accurate.
One reason that states do not more vigorously enforce participation
requirements may be that their data systems are not fully automated
and do not link the UI and the service providers’ information about
claimants.  Although DOL provided implementation grants to help fund
more coordinated data systems, it appears more assistance is needed.
As part of WIA implementation, states may be developing new data
systems to better coordinate the management information systems of
partners in their one-stop systems.  If so, we strongly recommend that
states explicitly design those systems to support WPRS.
• States should develop outcome reporting systems so that states
can comply with the reporting requirements.
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Although the WPRS legislation requires that states collect follow-
up information about claimants’ employment outcomes subsequent to
receiving WPRS services, over 40 percent of the states have not devel-
oped a follow-up reporting system.  Many UI administrators indicated
that developing such a system was a very difficult task.  We recom-
mend, therefore, that DOL provide more assistance to states in devel-
oping such reporting systems.  The implementation of WIA, which also
requires states to track subsequent employment and earnings of cus-
tomers, provides an opportunity to incorporate WPRS tracking require-
ments into states’ one-stop reporting systems.
Notes
1. Reports available from this study include U.S. Department of Labor (1996, 1997,
1999).
2. WPRS administrators were asked directly about the length of required services.
We calculated the number of required services by summing the services provided
in any required workshops, one-on-one services, and supervised job search.
3. When claimants are denied benefits in UI, they do not receive benefits for a specif-
ic period but their total entitlement is not changed.  Thus, for claimants who re-
ceive their full entitlement, the effect of denial is to postpone their benefits, not to
reduce them.
4. We grouped the tasks using factor analysis of the extent of involvement of the three
agencies in individual WPRS activities.
5. We collected data from two other states, Mississippi and Texas, but we chose not to
present estimates based on these two states because of problems with the reliabili-
ty of these data for evaluation purposes.
6. A recent paper (Black et al. 1998) examined the impact of WPRS in Kentucky over
approximately the same period used in our study.  The authors of that paper found
considerably larger impacts in Kentucky than we found.  According to their esti-
mates, WPRS reduced UI receipt by more than two weeks among their sample
members, compared with the 0.21-week reduction for our sample.  Black et al.
used a random assignment design that focuses on claimants whose benefit exhaus-
tion probabilities were near the probability threshold used to identify claimants to
be referred to WPRS services.  Since this approach focused on a relatively small
subgroup of claimants, the findings it yielded apply only to that subgroup.
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Comments on Chapter 3
John Heinberg
U.S. Department of Labor
My biggest challenge in trying to comment on Worker Profiling
and Remployment Services (WPRS) systems is what to call it.  It’s re-
ally a mouthful, so in my comments I am mainly going to use the word
“system.”  Although they reflect my own views, my comments come
from the perspective of my office, the Unemployment Insurance Ser-
vice (UIS) in the U.S. Department of Labor.  It has been the primary re-
sponsibility of UIS to oversee development of the state WPRS systems
from the federal perspective.  I think it’s fortunate that we have a panel
of state policymakers immediately following my comments, because I
can’t possibly summarize state views on these systems. 
My comments are directed to what I believe the chapter, and the
larger evaluation on which the chapter is based, tells our office and the
Labor Department more generally about the implementation and im-
pact of this system for targeting services.  The chapter really demon-
strates the wisdom of beginning an evaluation at the time an initiative is
launched.  Most often that is not done, so we have a great deal of infor-
mation on the system at what is still a very early point in its operation.
This system has been a very complex undertaking for the states.  The
authors have done an excellent job of pointing out the many challenges
and problems with system implementation.  These include the profiling
selection and referral practices, provision of reemployment services,
enforcing participation requirements, and tracking progress, services,
and outcomes.  
My strongest impression from the chapter, however, is that the state
systems have had a variable but limited impact on the intended out-
comes such as reducing UI payments, benefit duration, and the rate of
benefit exhaustion.  Even though the impact estimates are preliminary,
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it seems to me unlikely that the final version will turn out very differ-
ently.  So I think the key question, which we cannot yet answer, is
whether the lack of impact, particularly in some states, stems from
faulty logic or from incomplete implementation of an inherently sound
idea.  
If we try to look for reasons for the lack of impact, I think they have
to be teased out indirectly.  The authors provide some clues, but one
strong limitation of the evaluation is that it had a relatively minor field
component.  A point that was not brought up in the chapter itself con-
cerns what is actually happening in the system as it was implemented at
state and local levels.  Nevertheless, here are what appear to be some of
the factors.  It is important in the context of this meeting, and as the
chapter states early on, that developing effective systems involves
many complex tasks.  
The system that we are talking about here goes much beyond sim-
ply targeting services.  It involves the whole range of how referrals are
done, services are provided, outcomes are observed, and then what peo-
ple do with that information.  So, as designed, the system requires very
sophisticated methods for identifying and prioritizing clients and refer-
ring them, developing individual service plans, providing the intensity
and range of reemployment services, then tracking progress, establish-
ing and enforcing policies about denial of benefits, and measuring and
reporting the outcomes.  I think the chapter does not get into this as
much as I might emphasize.  The system, I believe, requires strong
management oversight of the total process so that all of the elements fit
together.  
The chapter implies that there are various points in the process
where the logic can and does break down in full scale real world imple-
mentation.  It points most clearly to two areas: 1) providing an adequate
range of reemployment services to referred claimants, and 2) proce-
dures on denial of benefits for failure to comply with requirements.
One comment I want to make about Dickinson’s presentation this
morning concerns a point that was not made in the chapter.  She hy-
pothesized that states aren’t requiring services in which clients are un-
likely to participate, since states would then be forced to deny benefits.
However, the evidence is that states don’t deny benefits to people for
failing to participate in services.  I also want to note that because of the
limited field component, the chapter does not provide a lot of informa-
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tion on effective practice for reemployment services provision—not
enough to provide a basis for system improvement.  
Here are some other factors that go beyond the two that the chapter
emphasized.  Dickinson did emphasize these quite a bit in her presenta-
tion.  The state-specific profiling models have not been fully imple-
mented or consistently updated.  As the chapter says, the states did not
consistently refer to services claimants with highest probability of ex-
haustion.  In her presentation, Dickinson reviewed the evidence on this.  
Even though the authorizing legislation requires that states track
outcomes, the chapter indicates that only about three-fifths of states
were doing so in 1997.  I looked at some of the more recent federal re-
porting data that have come in to us, and those numbers have edged up
only slightly.  Maybe two-thirds of the states recently reported that in-
formation.  Reporting has been hampered to a large extent, I under-
stand, by Y2K concerns.  Furthermore, WPRS system reporting has not
been fully automated.  The WPRS report is not in the regular group of
periodic reports which we receive from the states.  Unless the outcome
information is consistently tracked, validated, and reported, the vital
feedback information is not available for oversight and corrective ac-
tion.  Finally, it’s not clear exactly who is in charge of the system at ei-
ther the federal or state level.  
To summarize, the chapter shows us where in this complex process
the train can run off the track, and it gives strong evidence of the num-
ber of places where it in fact has.  I want to stress the following point:
at this relatively early stage in the implementation of this complex ini-
tiative, in trying to do something with all of the elements that we have
here, it is really soon to deduce much about what’s going on.  Further-
more, the evaluation is still incomplete, but I think the limited findings
call for increased attention from both federal and state overseers to en-
sure adherence to principles of WPRS implementation.  
I want to talk now about some of the next steps at the federal level
that we are either doing, or in some cases should be doing more inten-
sively.  But before I do that, I again want to mention two points that
Dickinson talked about somewhat in her presentation and in the chap-
ter, they are: the issue of referral to employment service registration for
people who are not in profiling, and the effect of telephone claims.  
My understanding is that telephone claims don’t change the
process.  They may change practices, but there is no relaxation of re-
quirements for referring profiled claimants to outside services simply
because the claim is taken by telephone.  I also think it goes too far to
say that profiling is the only way UI claimants can get referred to ser-
vices.  
We are currently making funds available to states for significant
improvement grants that are intended to increase the effectiveness of
reemployment services. We are really hoping for creative proposals
from states to address one or more of the implementation concerns
mentioned above.  One of the conclusions we’ve come to is that the
most important thing to do right now is to go directly to continuous im-
provements and not overprescribe.  Instead, we plan to make money
available to the states to work on whatever they think will help make
this complicated system work better.  We need to ensure that there are
complete and valid data reported to the federal government for use by
the states on services provided and outcomes.  The Labor Department
should analyze that data and use the findings for oversight of the WPRS
system.  
Finally, and this reiterates some of the points that Dickinson made
in her remarks, we should give more attention to providing oversight
and management of profiling and reemployment services.  This should
be considered a key part of ETA’s (Employment and Training Adminis-
tration, U.S. Department of Labor) implementation of the Workforce
Investment Act.  Only when we can say that this initiative is fully in
place will we really be in a position to validly assess the system’s im-
pacts on outcomes, and conclude whether it is cost-effective.  
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Walter Nicholson
Amherst College
This chapter provides a summary of the ongoing research on the
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) Systems initia-
tive.  That initiative and the research on it are interesting from a variety
of perspectives.  On a conceptual level, WPRS represents one of the
first attempts to use statistical modeling to target social services to
clients.  There is an obvious interest in determining how well this
works and the circumstances under which it can be more or less suc-
cessful.  Evaluating the success of the process also raises some unique
statistical issues that deserve detailed analysis.  On a more practical
level, the WPRS initiative raises questions about interagency coordina-
tion, the construction of appropriate information systems, and the actu-
al selection of reemployment services.  In these comments I focus
primarily on Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer’s treatment of the con-
ceptual issues, concluding with only a few words about their analysis of
the WPRS process.
PROFILING
The unique aspect of the WPRS initiative is, of course, the use of
statistical models to predict unemployment insurance (UI) claimants’
probabilities of exhaustion of benefits and the use of those probabilities
to target reemployment services.  Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer re-
port the interesting fact that most states have developed their own pro-
filing models and that some states even disaggregate these models by
substate region.  As someone who has run many, many regressions on
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unemployment insurance (UI) benefit exhaustions, I would have liked
somewhat more detail about differences among the state models and
why those differences arise.  Are state models importantly constrained
by the availability of certain variables on their administrative data files?
How well do these models seem to fit the data, and do some states man-
age to achieve much higher explanatory powers than others?  Are the
models employed in a “pure” way to calculate an index of service
needs?  Or is there some tinkering with the model results to achieve
what service deliverers believe to be “more reasonable” results?  I be-
lieve more detailed answers to these questions would be interesting to
researchers who wish to learn something about labor markets from the
states’ experiences in seeking to model exhaustion.  It would also be
quite interesting to state UI staff charged with trying to develop as good
a model as possible with existing data.  Finally, the development of a
more detailed typology of profiling models might be of help to the au-
thors in their ultimate goals of evaluating whether profiling actually im-
proves the delivery of reemployment services, the focus of my next set
of comments.
EVALUATING PROFILING
Although research on the effectiveness of the WPRS system is only
in its initial stages, the Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer chapter gives a
roadmap of how they intend to proceed. Because implementation of a
random assignment experiment was infeasible in the current context,
the authors have instead opted for methodology that uses as a compari-
son group claimants who passed the initial WPRS screens but who
were not referred to services.  In general, of course, those not referred
to services will have lower profiling “scores” than will those referred,
so a simple comparison between these two groups would undoubtedly
yield biased results.  Assuming that the profiling model can, at least
with large errors, identify claimants who will experience substantial
problems in finding new jobs, this bias would tend to understate the im-
pact of reemployment services, possibly even to the extent of yielding
the result that these services apparently harm claimants’ prospects.
Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer assure us that their procedure is more
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promising than most other comparison group analyses because they
“control for these criteria (i.e., the profiling scores) in regression mod-
els.”  They also point out, optimistically, that the variation in capacity
constraints over both time and region will help to break up what would
otherwise be an exact relationship between scores and service referral,
thereby improving the independent explanatory power of the profiling
score.  This procedure and the arguments that the authors make in sup-
port of it remind me of the “design dispute” that took place nearly 30
years ago in connection with the New Jersey Income Maintenance Ex-
periment.  In that case also, the researchers argued that a nonrandom as-
signment could in principle be accommodated in a regression frame-
work if the variables used to assign experimental cells were used as
additional independent variables in the analysis of experimental results.
The need to use such variables together with the inherent uncertainty
about the correct regression specification raised many concerns about
the validity of the New Jersey results, especially among practitioners
outside the community of research economists.  I fear the same result
may occur here.  At the very least, I hope Dickinson, Decker, and
Kreutzer will investigate the assumptions that must be made both to as-
sure that unbiased estimates can be obtained by including profiling
scores and to assess the importance of varying capacity constraint ef-
fects across their samples.
THE PROFILING PROCESS
The attention that Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer give to describ-
ing the profiling process and the data collection efforts that accompany
it is, in my mind, one of the real strengths of the research. Two aspects
of their discussion seem to me to be especially interesting: their at-
tempts to measure the extent of reemployment services received, and
their discussion of state tracking systems.  With regard to the former, I
would have liked to see even more on the actual content of reemploy-
ment services offered to claimants.  Research on the effectiveness of
such services continues to suffer from a “black box” approach that of-
fers little insight about what clients actually get.  Without such detail I
fear we will never be in a position to determine what works.  Dickin-
son, Decker, and Kreutzer have made a good start on trying to look into
the box—I hope they will push that part of the project further.
I hope that the authors’ discussion of the limitations of some state
data systems will provide a spur for improvements, perhaps directed
from the national level. In their research they have managed to learn
quite a bit about how these data systems work in practice.  One very
valuable outcome of the project could be the development of a general
blueprint for “best practices” that might be adopted more widely.
In all, this is an interesting progress report on one of the most im-
portant current initiatives in reemployment policy.  The authors have
done a good job of touching on both the practical and the analytical as-









W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Targeting employment services / Randall W. Eberts, Christopher
J. O’Leary, Stephen A. Wandner, editors.
p. cm.
Proceedings from a conference held on April 29 to May 1,
1999 in Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-244-1 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-243-3
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Unemployed—Services for—Government policy—United
States—Congresses. 2. Employment agencies—United States
—Management—Congresses. 3. Manpower policy—United States
—Congresses. I. Eberts, Randall W. II. O’Leary, Christopher





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are the
sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Jan Underhill.
Index prepared by Nancy Humphreys.
Printed in the United States of America.
